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Seventeenth-century France witnessed a long and complex process of disciplinary specialization, as 
the principal institutions of cultural and scientific activity took shape.1 Philosophy emerged from 
the universities and book markets began to expand and diversify.2 Literature was finding its own 
favoured places. These transformations were accompanied by an unprecedented effort to codify the 
language, forms and genres of writing – not always without resistance. From the end of the 
sixteenth century philosophy asserted its autonomy from theology,3 and its scope extended into the 
domains of the human and natural sciences.4 As for fiction, it was at once everywhere and 
nowhere.5 It was making its presence felt in areas from astronomy to law, even as the novel  
disguised itself as nouvelle historique, and travel accounts pretended to befactual narratives. In the 
dictionaries of the period fiction referred both to the act of dissimulating and to the result thereof, 
but its fields of application were surprisingly diverse. Fiction generally aroused suspicion; but it 
contributed to the formation of philosophical ideas and found validation in the field of law. 
Following its very early usage in astronomy, it infiltrated the domains of physics and mathematics 
with Descartes, Roberval and Leibniz in the Classical Age. Resistance to fiction was matched by 
the fascination it aroused. What proof value could be ascribed to fiction? Did it function in the same 
way as hypothesis? What to make of it in the field of natural science where it was deployed 
alongside the vocabulary of observation and experience? There was no consensus on these 
questions. The writers of the period put fiction, this new conceptual tool, to the test; some adopted it, 
others rejected it.  
 
Among those sceptical about the uses of fiction in philosophy was François Bernier. A 
physician, philosopher and traveller, Bernier eludes hasty categorization on account of the diversity 
of his institutional and mondain affiliations. In the 1650s he acquired a grounding in Epicurean 
philosophy with Gassendi, and he frequented learned circles hosted, most notably, by De Thou, 
                                                 
1 Alain Viala, Naissance de l’écrivain — sociologie de la littérature à l’âge classique (Paris: Minuit, 1985), p. 8. 
2 Dinah Ribard, Raconter, vivre, penser. Histoires de philosophes, 1650-1766 (Paris: Vrin, 2003), pp. 7-29. 
3 Ian Maclean, ‘The Readership of Philosophical Fictions: The Bibliographical Evidence’, in Philosophical Fictions and 
the French Renaissance, ed. by Neil Kenny (London: Warburg Institute, 1991), pp. 7-15 (pp. 8-9). 
4 The term philosophy is still understood here in its broad early modern sense and therefore covers the investigation of 
natural and human phenomena alike. Cf. Neil Kenny, ‘Introduction’ in Philosophical Fictions and the French 
Renaissance, pp. 1-6 (p. 1): ‘Philosophy’ is a ‘portmanteau category for all investigations into human and natural 
phenomena’. 
5 Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge in Europe, 1500-1800, ed. by Richard Scholar and Alexis Tadié (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010), ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-15. 
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Luillier, La Mothe Le Vayer, the Dupuy brothers, and Mersenne. Following a lengthy stay in India 
he became one of the staunchest habitués of the scientific and literary salon of Madame de La 
Sablière. At that time he devoted himself to Parisian life and to philosophy, and published his two 
major works. These were the Voyages (1670-1671), an epistolary work6 which secured his literary 
renown; and the Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi (1674-1684),7 in which he defended a rival 
philosophy to Cartesianism. Between these two apparently heterogeneous collections there are 
numerous points of intersection. Just as philosophy pervades the Voyages, so the Voyages are cited 
repeatedly in the Abrégé. The experience of the traveller plays a pivotal role in the philosophical 
stance adopted by Bernier, as it does in his apparent rejection of what he terms the ‘fictions’ of 
philosophers. Bernier demonstrates a certain resistance to the theoretical systematization which 
overwhelmed the field of physical science in the seventeenth century.8 His discourse is nonetheless 
still conditioned by the processes of fictional writing. If the record of Bernier’s practical experience 
is to be an antidote to the fictions of philosophers, it entails a recurrent generic instability. The 
Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi is replete with anecdotes borrowed from the Voyages. The 
voice of the traveller is superimposed on that of the philosopher, borrowing from the novelist’s 
repertoire the art of the story, the anecdote, and fictional dialogue. 
 
 In the autumn of 1655 Bernier set out from France on a voyage to the Orient which would 
last thirteen years. From 1659 to around 1667 he resided at the Mogul court of Aurangzeb, 
accompanying it on its peregrinations. He had the good fortune to enter into the service of the 
minister Daneshmend Khan,9 the ‘Seigneur Savant’ with whom he conducted an intellectual 
exchange of exceptional quality. Bernier wrote these words about his master and protector:  
 
Il ne peut non plus se passer de philosopher tout l’après-dîner sur les livres de Gassendi et 
Descartes, sur le globe et sur la sphère, ou sur l’anatomie, que de donner le matin tout entier 
                                                 
6 I refer to the following edition: Un Libertin dans l’Inde moghole. Les ‘Voyages’ de François Bernier (1656-1669), 
Frédéric Tinguely, Adrien Paschoud and Charles-Antoine Chamay eds. (Paris: Chandeigne, 2008). Further references to 
this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
7 The following edition is used: François Bernier, Abrégé de la Philosophie de Gassendi, ed. Anisson, Posuel & Rigaud, 
7 vols (Lyon: 1684; repr. by Sylvia Murr and Geneviève Stefani, Paris: Fayard, 1992). Further references to this edition 
are given after quotations in the text. 
8 Isabelle Moreau, ‘Fictions across Disciplines in Seventeenth-Century France’ in Fiction and the Frontiers of 
Knowledge in Europe, pp. 53-69. 
9 Daneshmend Khan (Danechmend-Kan, d.1670) was an eminent member of the Mogul courts of Shah Jahan and 
Aurangzeb. A merchant who arrived from Persia in 1646, Mohammad Shafi (or Mulla Shafiq Yazdi) was awarded the 
title of  ‘Seigneur Lettré’ for his great learning. He was notably appointed treasurer of the armed forces and was 
responsible for ‘affaires étrangères’, before becoming governor of Delhi. See the ‘Répertoire des personnages’ in 
Voyages p. 520. 
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aux grandes affaires du royaume en qualité de secrétaire d’Etat pour les affaires étrangères et 
de grand maître de la cavalerie. (Voyages, 369) 
 
Unfortunately, we have no written trace of these exchanges. We must be content with the two-
volume compilation that Bernier published under the title of Voyages on his return to France. Just as 
the Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi would contain an integrated account of his travel 
experience, so his Voyages already contained an entire letter on the doctrine of atoms and on the 
nature of human understanding. Addressed to Chapelle (a somewhat unruly former student of the 
learned Gassendi), this letter is a philosophical manifesto written in a conversational ‘style 
asiatique’ (353) as well as being an introduction to the philosophy of Gassendi.10  
 Firstly one must note the ethos assumed by Bernier. Defining himself as a ‘voyageur […] 
nourri dans l’école des atomes’, Bernier makes no claim to have found ‘de nouvelles raisons dans 
les Indes’ (353) concerning the delicate problem of the human soul and of animate matter in general. 
Quite to the contrary, he simultaneously appropriates the sceptical Cicero of the Academica and the 
position of Gassendi regarding the so-called inventions of the moderns,11 recalling that ‘tout ce 
qu’en ont dit les Modernes ou n’est rien, ou n’est pas nouveau’ (353). He himself has studied the 
matter with the greatest care and capitalizes on his travels to ‘confér[er] cent fois’ the opinion of the 
‘plus grands hommes’ with what was said by authors ‘tant anciens que modernes, qu’arabes, que 
persans, qu’indiens’ (349). Travel is fully integrated with sceptical experience and proves to be an 
excellent antidote to presumptive knowledge. Here Bernier assumes the inverse rhetorical position 
to that of Descartes in the Discours de la méthode. In place of the real voyage, in its own way as 
unsatisfying as the study of ancient philosophers, Descartes offered the ‘vaste allegorie de l‘homo 
viator’12 presented from the viewpoint of its favourable culmination. Bernier, for his part, is far 
from affirming his voice in a magisterial tone. Instead of presenting his own itinerary as exemplary, 
he emphasizes his doubts and makes no claims to have discovered the truth. If his travels have 
                                                 
10 See also the analysis of Jean-Charles Darmon, Philosophie épicurienne et littérature au XVIIe siècle. Études sur 
Gassendi, Cyrano de Bergerac, La Fontaine, Saint-Évremond (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), pp. 140-
147. 
11 See Charles Perrault’s parallel between Descartes and Gassendi in his Hommes illustres. Perrault remarked that 
Gassendi  ‘taschoit à faire voir par de favorables interpretations, que les Anciens avoient pensé les mesmes choses 
qu’on regardoit comme nouvelles’ (Ch. Perrault, Les Hommes illustres qui ont paru en France pendant ce siècle avec 
leurs portraits au naturel (Paris: Antoine Dezallier, 1697; repr. Geneva: Slatkine reprints, 1970), 2 tomes en 1 vol., I, 
63-64. 
12 Marc Fumaroli, ‘Ego scriptor: rhétorique et philosophie dans le Discours de la méthode’, in Problématique et 
réception du Discours de la méthode et des Essais, H. Méchoulan ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1988), pp. 31-46 (p. 41). Marc 
Fumaroli has shown how autobiographical narrative in fact depends on a ‘mythe’, or, in Descartes’s terms, a ‘fable’ (p. 
39). The historical and empirical ‘Je’ that emerges agreeably at the outset of the Discours, having studied the great book 
of the world, decides to confine itself to the ‘poêle’ in order to retreat more fully within itself. But in reality this ‘Je’ 
conceals a transcendental ‘Je’. Cf. René Descartes, Discours de la méthode, ed. G. Rodis-Lewis (Paris, GF-Flammarion: 
1966; repr. 1992), Première partie, pp. 25, 29-31. 
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brought him anything, it is above all a manner of philosophical thinking ‘en style asiatique’ (353) – 
a style opposed to the Cartesian ideal of ‘chaînes de raison’, ‘dont les géomètres ont coutume de se 
servir, pour parvenir à leurs plus difficiles démonstrations’.13 Bernier assumes an amicable tone and 
does not shun the digressions and chiaroscuros beloved of the Asiatic lands he had so long 
frequented.14 
 The letter is equally valuable as a philosophical manifesto and allows us to situate Bernier 
more clearly in the contemporary philosophical landscape. His first target is ancient materialism and 
its libertin avatars. Not without irony perhaps (and here we encounter the chiaroscuros of his 
writing), Bernier distances himself from ‘Messieurs les esprits forts’ (347) who wrongly confuse 
‘authentic’ Gassendism with a vacuist and materialist atomism that is strictly Epicurean. If he 
refuses to believe that ‘dans l’homme, et même dans tout l’univers, il n’y ait rien autre chose que de 
corporel, que mouvements locaux et corporels, que corps, qu’atomes, que matière’ (358), he refuses 
in equal measure the extreme opposite, which consists in believing that ‘dans l’homme, il y ait 
quelque chose de divin, quelque particule de la divinité ou quelque chose de semblable’ (357-8). In 
this second group of targets we find the partisans of the theory of the world soul: 
 
C’est un blasphème insupportable et hors de raison de quelques stoïciens, des cabalistes de 
Perse et des brahmanes des Indes, qui, pour reconnaître clairement la noblesse et la 
perfection de l’esprit de l’homme, ont mieux aimé se jeter dans cette extrémité que de le 
croire si bas et si imparfait que d’être tout corps, tout matière, tout corporel. Je n’ai pas 
garde de donner dans cette pensée : vous verrez dans la lettre de Monsieur Chapelain que je 
suis bien éloigné de croire que ce soit une opinion soutenable à un philosophe (358) 
 
In a celebrated passage of the Voyages addressed to Chapelain, Bernier aligns ancient Monist 
pantheism with the Brahmans’ exotic image of  God within the universe as a spider within its web. 
                                                 
13 R. Descartes, Discours de la méthode, seconde partie, p. 40. Voir sur ce point Pierre-Alain Cahné, Un autre 
Descartes. Le philosophe et son langage (Paris: Vrin, 1980), p. 16; pp. 25-36. 
14 On his return from Asia Bernier was all but obliged to bring with him a ‘style asiatique’  – in contravention of the 
expectations of a mondain public seduced by the moderate attic style of the modern philosophers. His choice of prose 
letter is moreover at odds with the norms of the genre, since the prose letter was usually situated in the tradition of the 
middle style of the Epistulae ad Atticum and their ‘attic’ aesthetic. See the work of Marc Fumaroli, especially the 
general conclusion of L’Âge de l’éloquence, which focuses on the conflicts and mutations of these two rhetorical forms 
in France (M. Fumaroli, L’Âge de l’éloquence. Rhétorique et « res literaria » de la Renaissance au seuil de l’époque 
classique (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994), pp. 673-706). See also Roger Zuber, Les « Belles Infidèles » et la formation du 
goût classique. Perrot d’Ablancourt et Guez de Balzac (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968), pp. 361-70, 391-411; Jean Jehasse, 
Guez de Balzac et le génie romain (Saint-Etienne: Université de Saint-Etienne, [1977]), pp. 441-45; et Jean Lafond (éd.), 
Les Formes brèves de la prose et le discours discontinu (XVIe-XVIIe siècles) (Paris: Vrin, 1984). 
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Pierre Bayle would recall this very image in his Dictionnaire historique et critique when he set 
forth what he had understood of the doctrine of Spinoza.15 
 The final target of Bernier’s polemic – but not the least – is the philosophy of Descartes. 
This time his critique operates on two levels. Bernier generally discredits those who claim to act in 
the domain of physics as do ‘les géomètres’ in the realm of mathematics  (365). He also underscores 
the weakness of Descartes’s replies to criticism made by Arnauld and Gassendi (353-4), and 
denigrates a number of Cartesian postulates without expanding on them, notably that of ‘la matière 
subtile’ (352).  
 
 We find these three critiques amplified to varying degrees in the Abrégé de la philosophie 
de Gassendi. They coalesce around a focal point, as revealed by a study of the occurrences of the 
the word ‘fiction’. I allude briefly to this point which I have analysed elsewhere.16 Bernier 
discredits theories of the structure of the universe, each time on the grounds of physical and logical 
impossibilities: be it ancient materialism, particularly the clinamen of Lucretius invoked to explain 
the formation of masses in the universe from ‘un tricoti et un concours aveugle de petits corps’;17 
the latest avatars of the world soul; or else Descartes’s narrative of a new genesis from a mass of  
‘matière subtile’. The term ‘fiction’ thus signifies a hypothesis in a degraded state, a hypothesis 
which has begun to generate errors because detached from experience and observation. Bernier’s 
position on the uses of fiction in philosophy forms part of a much broader current of thinking in the 
Classical Age on correct use of hypotheses in the field of natural science, especially in physics. As 
both traveller and philosopher, Bernier defends experimental discourse and the experience of the 
practical investigator. His critique of philosophers’ fictions is but the most visible element of a blind 
opposition to anything unsupported by experience. This allows us to understand Bernier’s 
divergence from a strict intepretation of the Syntagma Philosophicum. As Sylvia Murr has 
demonstrated,18 Bernier was not merely content to translate the monumental work of his master. 
Bernier summarizes – but he also inserts and occasionally adds commentary. He inserts comments 
drawn from his travel experience. Furthermore he replaces certain lines of argument developed by 
Gassendi which had become obsolete, relating to experiments on the vacuum, and in the domain of 
medicine (notably in anatomy and physiology). Finally he adds an entire series of doubts: the 
                                                 
15 Isabelle Moreau, ‘L’Araignée dans sa toile. Mise en images de l’âme du monde de François Bernier et Pierre Bayle à 
l’Encyclopédie.’ in Les Lumières en mouvement. La circulation des idées au XVIIIe siècle, ed. Isabelle Moreau (Lyon: 
ENS Éditions, 2009), pp. 199-228. 
16 Isabelle Moreau, ‘Fictions across Disciplines’, pp. 53-69. 
17 Voyages, p. 360 ; Abrégé, t. II, livre 1, chap. 13, p. 117. 
18 Sylvia Murr, ‘Bernier et Gassendi : une filiation déviationniste ?’, in Gassendi et l’Europe, ed. S. Murr (Paris: Vrin, 
1997), pp. 71-114; ‘Bernier et le gassendisme’, Corpus, 20-21 (1992), pp. 115-135. 
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doubts of the Traité du Libre et du Volontaire aimed at Malebranche and the Doutes sur quelques-
uns des principaux chapitres de son Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi first published separately 
in 1681, then republished in volume II of the 1684 edition of the Abrégé. 
 Such additions form part of Bernier’s efforts to modernize the framing of philosophical 
problems, as Sylvia Murr has shown. In this respect the Abrégé’s rhetoric  is closely linked to the 
philosophical context. Concern for establishing a worldly reputation inflects its form, terminology 
and choice of speculative themes: Bernier gives priority to those which dominated conversations in 
the circles and salons he frequented. The Doutes sur quelques-uns des principaux chapitres de son 
Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi, nonetheless, merit our interest in that they enable us to 
pinpoint the originality of Bernier the philosopher. As he himself wrote in the preface ‘Au lecteur’ 
of 1681: 
 
Ces doutes sont non pas sur le fond de cette philosophie, car je ne crois pas qu’on puisse 
raisonnablement philosopher sur un autre système que celui des atomes et du vide, mais sur 
certaines matières qui ne laissent pas d’être fort considérables, tels que sont l’espace, le lieu, 
le mouvement, le temps, l’éternité et quelques autres. Au reste, que ces doutes soient bien ou 
mal fondés, vous en jugerez. Ce petit livre vous servira toujours à deux choses ; l’une à vous 
faire voir la pauvreté de toutes nos philosophies (il y a plus de trente ans que je philosophe 
tres-persuadé de certaines choses ; et voilà cependant que je commence à en douter) ; l’autre, 
à donner comme une idée générale de la philosophie de Gassendi, laquelle, après tout, me 
semble la plus raisonnable de toutes, la plus simple, la plus sensible et la plus aisée.19 
 
 
Here again we encounter the sceptical ethos of the philosophical traveller, and also his pragmatism. 
Bernier’s criticism tends in the direction of refusing abstract terms ‘qui comme tous les autres de 
cette sorte, nous portent à l’erreur, si nous concevons quelque chose d’abstrait, ou de separé du 
concret’.20 Equally his critique stems from a desire to simplify philosophical discourse : ‘il arrive 
souvent à force de vouloir trop penetrer, que nous gastons tout, que nous obscurcissons les choses 
les plus claires et que nous faisons des difficultez oû il n’y en a point’.21 For example, he takes issue 
with the Gassendian concept of space, because when defined in this way space can only be ‘une 
chose qui n’est point, qui n’existe point, […] qui n’est qu’une pure fiction, ou un Estre purement 
imaginaire’.22 Bernier’s doubts concern not so much the principles of Gassendi’s philosophy as 
certain categories necessary to describe the physical world. Fiction is so much more difficult to hunt 
down when it has to be sought at the level of narrative sequence, of the sentence, or even of the 
                                                 
19 Bernier, Doutes sur quelques-uns des principaux chapitres de son Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi, ‘Au lecteur’ 
(Paris: Estienne Michallet, 1681). 
20 Abrégé, t. II, Doute 1, p. 264. 
21 Abrégé, t. II, Doute 12, p. 319. 
22 Abrégé, t. II, Doute 3, p. 276. 
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phrase. In other words, fiction has hidden away at the heart of concepts; and this involves the same 
mechanism as that which subordinates observation to conceptualization and explanation, ‘au lieu 
qu’un Physicien doit rechercher ce que les choses sont en effet, et conformer sa conception aux 
choses’:23 
Cecy supposé, j’estime que demesme que pour connoistre la nature du Lieu, il ne faut point 
tant subtiliser, ni avoir recours à je ne sçais quel Estre eternel, et immobile qui ne se trouve 
point en Nature, le Lieu n’estant autre chose que la superficie du corps qui environne, ainsi 
pour connoistre la nature du Temps, il ne faut point aussi avoir recours à je ne sçais quel 
Flux eternel, et uniforme, qu’on ne sçauroit trouver nulle part ; […] ! En un mot à un Estre 
qui n’est que dans la seule imagination ; le Temps, comme dit Lucrece, n’estant assurement 
rien de soy, rien d’abstrait ou de separé du mouvement des corps. (Abrégé, t. II Doute 12, p. 
317) 
 
The philosopher who has recourse to ‘un Estre… qui ne tombe nullement sous les Sens’, a being 
that Bernier considers ‘purement imaginaire’ ,24 is merely chasing shadows. The methodological 
error is all the more destructive here in that the fiction it fashions suppresses all the benefits of a 
conceptual procedure based on experience and observation. 
 
 Since Bernier sought a philosophical discourse which would directly represent reality, he 
strove to promote a mode of philosophical thinking that would shun the seductive fallacies of 
fiction. In the Abrégé these efforts manifest themselves in two ways: through additions of his own 
creation, and through a semantic reworking at the conceptual level. 
 Earlier I alluded to the doubts which Bernier the philosopher inserted into his Abrégé. To 
pursue this line of analysis it is necessary to explain Bernier’s difficulties in setting forth certain 
Gassendian concepts. Notable here was the concept of the ‘animation générale du monde’, 
dangerously close to the fiction of the world soul. There is a great deal to be said here on the 
various uses of analogy in philosophical discourse – but this would be too great a digression.25 I 
will focus instead on the traveller’s additions insofar as they pose a specific problem of genre. 
Writers of travel narratives lay claim to an unadorned, simple style: the absence of affectation 
should ensure that the travel narrative is identified as belonging to the genre of history as document. 
Yet at the same time it derives its narrative forms and scene-setting techniques from novelistic 
genres. To put it another way: the travel narrative is an eminently unstable genre. Once Bernier 
                                                 
23 Abrégé, t. II, Doute 1, p. 266. 
24 Abrégé, t. II, Doute 2, p. 269 ; p. 271. 
25 C. Margat-Barberis, ‘art. Fiction’ in Encyclopédie philosophique universelle (Paris: PUF). 
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started to use extracts from his Voyages to substantiate his Abrégé we can assume henceforth that 
this generic instability permeates his philosophical discourse. 
 In his Abrégé Bernier regularly refers the reader to his practical experience, conveyed 
notably in his use of self-quotation. Points of convergence between the heterogeneous genres of 
philosophical treatise and travel narrative are made conspicuous through differentiated enunciation 
and avoidance of the impersonal style. Granted, Bernier readily uses the third-person pronoun ‘on’; 
but equally he employs ‘nous’, and ‘je’ is abundantly present. When he chooses not to follow the 
Syntagma to the letter it is either because he feels the need to comment on particular points, or to 
include more substantial developments of his own. But at each deviation, however minute, Bernier 
signals the enunciative discontinuity either before or after his insertion, sharply distinguishing his 
voice from that of the author, whom he calls ‘notre philosophe’ or ‘notre auteur’. The anecdotes he 
relates may be new material. Thus in volume II, in the chapter entitled ‘De l’existence et providence 
de Dieu’, Bernier adds to the expected disquisition on the proof of God’s existence from 
contemplation of nature, the remarks of his master Daneshmend Khan: 
 
N’ajouteray-je point icy qu’entre les preuves qui regardent la Providence il n’y en a point 
qui plûssent davantage à Daneche-mend-kan un des plus celebres sçavants de l’Asie, et des 
puissans Omerahs de la Cour du Grand Mogol, que celles qui se tirent de l’Usage des 
Parties. Il n’y a pas, me disoit ce Grand homme, jusqu’aux parties les plus grossieres, les 
Parties naturelles de l’Homme, et de la Femme, qui ne marquent une destination 
particuliere à leurs usages ordinaires, et par consequent une souveraine Providence qui 
dans le dessein de multiplier, et perpetuer ses Ouvrages, les y ait expressement destinées, 
tant elles paroissent formées, ajustées, et appropriées l’une pour l’autre,… (Abrégé, t. II, 
livre. 1, chap. XVII, p. 176-7) 
 
The comments attributed to his master are related in direct speech and constitute a burlesque praise 
of male and female genitalia and of sexual pleasure: a short, discreetly irreverent aside before 
concluding the chapter. Bernier promises to return in due course to the more serious arguments of 
Gassendi, ‘car notre Autheur semble s’estre surpassé luy-mesme en cecy, tant il paroit avoir esté 
persuadé de l’existence d’un Souverain Estre, et d’une Divine Providence !’ (177).  
 For the most part, however, the additions are verbatim recapitulations of passages from the 
Voyages: these are clearly identified and identical to the source text in all but a few details – except 
where several pages are summarized in a new development that retains only the main argument. 
Bernier’s recapitulations may be intended to inform, and to make up for gaps or errors in 
Gassendi’s knowledge: hence the chapters on the source of the Nile and rain cycles of Ethiopia. 
Bernier wrote to Thévenot: 
 9 
 
je vous donnerai de bonne foi ce que j’en ai écrit après avoir vu deux fois cet accroissement 
et l’avoir examiné très curieusement, et après avoir remarqué des choses dans les Indes qui 
m’ont donné de plus grands avantages pour cela que n’en pouvait avoir ce grand homme 
[Gassendi] qui en a si ingénieusement et si doctement écrit, quoiqu’il n’eût vu l’Égypte que 
dans son cabinet. (Voyages, 448) 
 
Here we note the imposing register of the eye witness, characteristic of travel narratives. Bernier’s 
geographical knowledge is not only bookish, but also a practical knowledge combining direct 
personal experience and first-hand accounts. Bernier is all the more categorical on this matter, being 
in a position to corroborate the testimony of the Reverend Fathers of the Company of Jesus Almeida, 
Alphonso Mendez and Hieronimo Lobo, who all had long stays in Ethiopia. 
 
Leur temoignage me semble mesme d’autant plus considerable, qu’il s’accorde non seulement 
avec les Lettres qu’autrefois David Roy d’Ethiopie ecrivit au Pape Clement VIII et à Emanuel 
Roy de Portugal, mais aussi avec ce que j’en ay appris à Moka proche de Babelmandel de 
plusieurs Marchands d’Ethiopie, et entre autres d’un nommé Murat Armenien d’Alep, qui 
estoit depuis long-temps habitué dans le Pays, et que j’ay veu depuis Ambassadeur du Roy 
d’Ethiopie à la Cour du Grand Mogol : Voyez la Carte suivante qui a esté tirée sur l’Original 
que nous devons aux soins de l’illustre Monsieur Thevenot.26 
 
Here Bernier’s discourse is the discourse of authority, a display of certain knowledge. In place of an 
erroneous savoir de cabinet he may legitimately propose his own travel narratives and present 
himself as an authority in learned circles – indeed, had he not, on his return from India, corrected 
the ‘celebre Monsieur de la Chambre’ who believed that ‘le debordement du Nil venoit de la 
fermentation et ebullition de la Terre Nitreuse d’Egypte’?27 An ‘ingenious’ opinion (in other words, 
a ‘fiction’) which does not stand up to empirical observation. By dint of the very same observation 
he justifies hypotheses on the source of rain, springs and rivers, and ventures passing critiques here 
and there of certain ancient opinions, or of Gassendi’s theories. 
 The testimony of the traveller is not always at odds with the knowledge of the armchair 
philosopher: the now well-worn topos of traveller’s observation versus the palimpsest of authorities 
is coupled with the ideal, shared by a number of travellers, of the complementarity of ancient and 
modern sources. When Bernier evokes the virtue of frugality in chapter VII, he concludes a series of 
examples drawn from Antiquity with a ‘Peinture des Diogenes des Indes’: 
 
                                                 
26 Abrégé, t. V, livre 1, chap. III, p. 43-55 (‘De l’Origine du Nil’, pp. 44-45) ; Voyages, pp. 448-452. 
27 Abrégé, t. V, livre 1, chap. III, p. 48. 
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A propos de tout ceci, je ne dois, ce semble, pas omettre ce que je sçais de la vie des Indiens 
Orientaux, quand ce ne seroit que pour faire voir que toutes ces belles choses que nous venons 
de dire, ne sont pas de pures Speculations Philosophiques, mais qu’il y a des peuples entiers 
qui menent une vie aussi frugale, et qui se contentent d’aussi peu de chose soit pour le boire, 
ou le manger, soit pour les habillemens, que tous ces Cyniques, Stoiciens, et Epicuriens.28 
 
 
The portrait of these ‘Fakirs… qui aussi bien que Diogene vont tout nuds’, aims to give 
philosophical speculations a renewed relevance, offering a concrete application of a moral 
philosophical problem. Fakirs, Brahmans and ‘Banyanes’ indeed eat very little and drink only water, 
‘et cependant ils vivent dumoins aussi tranquillement, aussi joyeux, et aussi contens que nous, 
beaucoup plus sains, dumoins aussi forts et aussi robustes’ (180). This exotic illustration of virtuous 
frugality is not however lacking in irony when we recall that, in the original text of the Voyages, the 
portrait of the ‘Fakirs’ was largely derogatory: 
 
Toutes ces choses si extraordinaires, à vous dire le vrai, me surprenaient fort dans le 
commencement : je ne savais qu’en dire et qu’en penser. Tantôt je les considérais comme 
quelques restes, ou comme les auteurs de cette ancienne et infâme secte cynique, sinon que 
je ne remarquais en eux que brutalité et ignorance, et qu’ils me semblaient plutôt des arbres 
qui se remuaient un peu d’un lieu à autre que des animaux raisonnables ; tantôt je les 
considérais comme gens entêtés de religion ; mais comme j’ai déjà dit, je ne pouvais 
remarquer en tout cela aucune ombre de vraie piété ; tantôt je pensais en moi-même que 
cette vie paresseuse, fainéante et indépendante de gueux pourrait bien avoir quelque chose 
d’attrayant ; tantôt que la vanité, qui se fourre partout et qui se trouve aussi souvent sous le 
manteau rapetassé d’un Diogène que sous les bons habits d’un Platon, pourrait être ce 
ressort qui faisait jouer tant de machines. Et puis, faisant encore réflexion sur la misérable et 
austère vie qu’ils menaient, je ne savais plus quel jugement en porter. (Voyages, 319) 
 
Here we see how the testimony of the practical observer acts as a counterweight to those elements 
of philosophical discourse liable to excessive speculation. The same practical concerns move 
Bernier to supplement the Gassendian critique of astrologers’ false knowledge, in these terms: 
 
Au reste, on ne trouvera peutestre pas mauvais que je mesle icy quelque chose de ce que j’ay 
dit des Astrologues dans ma Relation des Estats du grand Mogol, quand ce ne seroit que 
pour nous delasser un peu l’Esprit de cette grande application où M. Gassendi nous a tenu 
jusques à présent ? Voicy mes termes. 29 
 
                                                 
28 Abrégé, t. VII, livre 1, chap. VI, p. 179-180 ; Voyages, p. 319. 
29 Abrégé, t. IV, 4e partie, chap. XII : « Que les Responses par lesquelles les Astrologues taschent d’affermir, et de 
defendre leurs Dogmes, sont vains et frivoles. », pp. 403-405 (p. 403); Voyages, pp. 165-167. 
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Apart from one or two stylistic alterations which emphasize the personal involvement of the author, 
the text is an almost identical reproduction. Bernier relates here his observations on Indian 
astrologers, supplemented with a famous ‘conte’ that portrays the humiliation of a court astrologer 
confronted with the rather uncouth common sense of a head gardener.30 This passage is clearly 
intended to entertain, to put the reader at ease: at the heart of the philosophical treatise, it introduces 
a different type of narrative as well as different sort of logic. Just as the philosopher makes way for 
the historical and empirical ‘Je’, the (philosophical) example becomes anecdotal, and this transition 
is marked by the use of tenses and the occasional departures from the impersonal present tense in 
the narrative. 
 Is this fiction’s return? Has Bernier banished philosophers’ fictions only to smuggle in fable 
and literary invention? This point is open to debate. For Bernier the traveller’s experience remains 
an antidote to philosophers’ fictions. Although his discourse does not totally bypass the processes of 
fictional writing, his anecdotes do not belong as such to the tradition of mirabilia.31 There are no 
acephalous monsters to be found in the Voyages. Moreover, when Bernier relates the ‘merveilles’ of 
a spring which he went to see on the recommendation of his master, his purpose is to put forward a 
rational explanation for the phenomenon of its irregular flow. 
Les gentils ont là sur le bord du réservoir un petit deüra ou temple d’idole de Brare, qui est 
un de leurs deütas ou fausses divinités, et c’est pour cela qu’ils appellent cette fontaine 
Send-brary, comme qui dirait eau de Brare, et qu’ils viennent là de toutes parts en pèlerinage 
pour se baigner et sanctifier dans cette eau miraculeuse. Ils font sur l’origine de cette eau 
plusieurs fables que je ne vous rapporterai point, parce que je n’y vois aucune ombre de 
vérité. Pendant cinq ou six jours que je demeurai là, je fis tous mes efforts pour trouver la 
raison de cette merveille. (Voyages, 418-9) 
 
Bernier replaces the narrative of pagan ‘fables’ with an account of the steps he undertook to 
discover the ‘causes’ of the ‘prétendu miracle’ (419). The explanation he puts forward remains in 
the realm of the hypothetical, yet it is an appreciably probable hypothesis. His ‘imagination’ is 
‘d’autant plus raisonnable’ (420) in that it takes into account the indigenous topography, 
corroborating the testimonies of local inhabitants. In the Voyages Bernier’s interest in marvels and 
miracles extends only as far as his capacity to demonstrate their underlying causes.32 In the case of 
the marvellous spring he puts forward a ‘raisonnable’ explanation of an extraordinary phenomenon. 
                                                 
30 See Appendix. 
31 Frank Lestringant, ‘Fortunes de la singularité à la Renaissance: le genre de l’Isolario’, in Écrire le monde à la 
Renaissance. Quinze études sur Rabelais, Postel, Bodin et la littérature géographique (Caen-Orléans: Éditions 
Paradigmes, 1993), pp. 17-48, especially pp. 30-31. 
32 See Frédéric Tinguely, ‘Un paradis sans miracles. Le Cachemire de François Bernier’, in Etudes de Lettres, 3 (2006): 
‘Voyage et libertinage (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)’, ed. F. Tinguely and A. Paschoud, pp. 55-69. 
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Elsewhere in the Voyages he exposes human deceitfulness, that of astrologers who frequent the 
court as well as that of pagans and Mullah miracle-makers. 
 When Bernier recapitulates in the Abrégé what he had written about astrological imposture 
in the Voyages, his aim is not radically different: he is still concerned with denouncing imposture. 
This borrowing from the Voyages concludes a series of three chapters devoted to astrologers, in a 
volume which is itself devoted to the physics of celestial bodies. The change in tone is palpable; but 
the story of the gardener is not a tale told for its own sake – or at least, it is not only that. For one 
thing, Bernier relates it in indirect speech: he does not explicitly say whether he heard the story at 
court, nor who passed it on to him; but we can reasonably assume that it was indeed circulating in 
the milieux he frequented, notably those of his master Daneshmend Khan. Whether the story was 
invented or simply embellished matters little: its performativity is what matters, and this is certainly 
real. The story forms part of the ‘discours’ attributed to ‘des gens entendus’, who are critical of 
judicial astrology. In his Voyages Bernier barely outlines the expected parallel between the judicial 
astrology which ran riot at the court of the great Mogul and that which was rife in European 
courts.33 Rather, this whole development in the Abrégé, borrowed from the Voyages, is preceded by 
another anecdote – this one true – concerning the astrologer Morin: 
 
Je pourrois icy rapporter en detail l’Horoscope de M. Maridat Conseiller au Grand Conseil, 
dans laquelle on verroit que l’Astrologue Jean Baptiste Morin qui l’a dressée a aussi bien 
reüssi que Nostradamus dans celle de M. Suffredy ; mais tout cela est tellement plein de 
sottises, de badineries, et de faux evenemens, et sent tellement le Charlatan, et la Bohemiene 
qui ne bute qu’à tromper, et à attraper une piece d’argent, que j’ay de la peine à m’y arrester. 
§ Je diray seulement à la honte eternelle de cet Astrologue Morin, que voyant que M. 
Gassendi qui se mocquoit de son Astrologie Judiciaire estoit infirme, et atteint d’une fluxion 
sur la poitrine, il fut assez impudent pour predire et faire sçavoir à tout le monde par un 
Imprimé expres qu’il mourroit sur la fin de Juillet, ou au commencement d’Aoust de l’année 
1650, pretendant par là eriger un Trophée à son Astrologie ; et cependant M. Gassendi ne se 
porta jamais mieux qu’en ce temps-là, et il reprit tellement de forces qu’il me souvient que 
le cinquieme de Fevrier de l’année suivante, nous montasmes ensemble la Montagne de 
Toulon pour faire les Experiences du Vuide. (Abrégé, t. IV, 4e partie, chap. XII, p. 395) 
 
Bernier had in fact participated in the quarrel between Gassendi and Morin with two Latin 
pamphlets in the period 1651-1653. The example cited above proves that the best pamphlet is no 
match for the well-turned short anecdote when it comes to getting the audience on one’s side. The 
Morin example illustrates the bankruptcy of judicial astrology better than the finest possible 
raisonnement. Similarly, the views of the ‘entendus’ at the Court of the great Mogul did not vex the 
                                                 
33 Voyages, pp. 165-166. 
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astrologers as much as ‘ce conte qui s’est rendu fameux’ concerning the king, the astrologer and the 
gardener. Thus deployed, this story has the flavour of a real-life anecdote.  
 Moreover this example could be compared with the fictitious dialogue in the Abrégé 
between a Dervish and a Turk on the subject of the fatalism that held sway in the Orient.34 Here yet 
another step towards fiction seems to have been taken. The dialogue of the Turk appears in indirect 
speech, following an introduction which clearly underscores its exemplarity and its constructedness: 
‘…comment pensez-vous qu’un Turc, par exemple, excuse ses crimes quand un Derviche 
entreprend de luy faire quelque remontrance ? Hé quoy, Derviche, dit-il, est-ce que tu ne 
sçais pas aussi bien que moy, que tout est ecrit là haut, que ce sont des Caracteres 
ineffaçables, et des Decrets eternels et irrevocables ? Ne conviens-tu pas aussi avec moy, 
que cette pretendüe Liberté, ce pretendu pouvoir à faire, ou à ne faire pas, à faire bien, ou à 
faire mal, est un vain phantôme des Iahours ou Infidelles, et par consequent qu’il n’y a au 
plus en nous que du Volontaire, que de la pente, de l’inclination, ce qui est bien eloigné de 
ce qu’ils appellent Libre, de ce qu’ils appellent Liberté ?... ’ (VII, 3, 423-4)  
 
The theatrical staging, the vehemence of the speech, evidently derive their effects from the trusty art 
of oratory. It is uncertain whether Bernier would have acknowledged accusations of fabrication. He 
says elsewhere in the Voyages (161): ‘il est impossible qu’on puisse savoir et rapporter ces sortes 
des choses mot pour mot et qu’on n’y mette rien du sien’. The Turk’s speech is unquestionably 
written in a European idiom rather than ‘en style asiatique’, but it is grounded in reality: ‘ce sont là 
les discours, et les excuses ordinaires de ces malheureux Mahumetans, ou plutost ces blasphemes 
qui m’ont souvent fait trembler ou en les lisant dans leurs Livres, ou en les entendant de leur 
bouche’ (VII, 424). In the Abrégé the Turk’s speech starkly illustrates the dangers of a belief in 
strict predestination. It is the culmination of a lengthy discussion of the delicate problem of free will 
also presented in the form of a dialogue. Thus, if Bernier allows himself to speak his mind on a 
subject as controversial as this, without being a theologian, he does so under the auspices of a 
different authority. It is because he had ‘longtemps demeuré parmy les Nations entestées de 
Predestination’ (VII, 423) that Bernier denounces the dangers of such a doctrine. His experience as 
a traveller is what enables him to shift the debate from the register of theological speculation to that 
of political pragmatism, without further trifling ‘à reveiller des Difficultez qui ne servent qu’à 
embarraser les Esprits’ (VII, 427). 
 In Bernier’s writings, the rejection of philosophical speculation entails the promotion of 
observation and personal experience. The stories he relates are neither text-book examples, nor 
thought experiments in the abstract. In this sense they do not conform to the scheme of 
                                                 
34 Abrégé, tome VII, livre 3, chap. III, pp. 423-424. 
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philosophical fiction, at least as it was theorized and practised at the time. Bernier’s method does 
not exclude theorization, but subordinates it to the experience of the traveller: his anecdotes are 
real-life anecdotes, or they are constructed on the basis of real-life experience. In this way, they are 
true: ‘ce ne sont point des visions de Voyageur’ (VII, 248). What we find here is a tendency 
towards a ‘realism’ which would have great difficulty in establishing itself, if the embittered 
declarations of Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, formulated scarcely a century later, are anything to 
go by: 
 
Je suis voyageur et marin ; c’est-à-dire, un menteur, et un imbécile aux yeux de cette classe 
d’écrivains paresseux et superbes qui, dans les ombres de leur cabinet, philosophent à perte 
de vue sur le monde et ses habitants, et soumettent impérieusement la nature à leurs 
imaginations. Procédé bien singulier, bien inconcevable de la part de gens qui, n’ayant rien 
observé par eux-mêmes, n’écrivent, ne dogmatisent que d’après des observations 




Tous ces discours déplaisaient beaucoup aux astrologues, mais rien ne les fâchait tant que ce conte 
qui s’est rendu fameux : que le grand Shah Abbas, roi de Perse, avait fait bêcher et préparer un petit 
lieu dans son sérail pour faire un jardin ; les petits arbres étaient tout prêts et le jardinier prétendait 
de les planter le lendemain ; cependant l’astrologue, faisant l’homme d’importance, dit qu’il fallait 
prendre le sahet favorable pour les planter, afin qu’ils pussent bien réussir. Shah Abbas en fut 
content, l’astrologue prit ses instruments, feuilleta ses livres, fit ses calculs et conclut qu’à raison de 
telle et telle conjoncture et regards des planètes, il était nécessaire de les planter à l’heure même. Le 
maître-jardinier, qui ne songeait à rien moins qu’à l’astrologue, ne se trouva pas là présent, mais on 
ne laissa pas de mettre la main à l’œuvre : l’on fit des trous et on planta tous ces arbres, Shah Abbas 
lui-même les posant dans leur place pour qu’on pût dire que c’était des arbres plantés de la propre 
main de Shah Abbas. Le maître-jardinier, qui revint sur le soir, fut bien étonné de trouver la 
besogne faite et, voyant que cela n’était point selon le lieu propre et l’ordre qu’il avait destinés, 
qu’un abricotier par exemple était dans le solage d’un pommier et un poirier dans celui d’un 
amandier, bien fâché contre l’astrologue, fit tout arracher les arbrisseaux et les coucha comme il les 
avait laissés avec un peu de terre sur la racine pour le lendemain. Incontinent, on en donna nouvelle 
à l’astrologue et lui à Shah Abbas, qui fit aussitôt venir le jardinier et qui, en colère, lui demanda 
pourquoi il avait été si osé que d’arracher ces arbres qu’il avait lui-même plantés de sa main ; qu’au 
reste, on avait pris très exactement le sahet ; que jamais on n’y reviendrait, qu’on n’en saurait 
jamais trouver un si bon et qu’ainsi il avait tout gâté et tout perdu. Le rustaud de jardinier, qui avait 
un peu de vin de Chiraz dans la tête, regarda l’astrologue de travers et lui dit ces trois mots en 
grondant et en jurant : ‘Billah, billah, il fallait bien que ce fût un admirable sahet, celui que tu as 
pris pour ces arbres, astrologue de malheur ; ils ont été plantés aujourd’hui à midi et ce soir ils ont 
été arrachés !’ Quand Shah Abbas entendit ce raisonnement, il se mit à rire, tourna le dos à 
l’astrologue et se retira. (Voyages, 166-167) 
 
                                                 
35 Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, Voyage autour du monde par la frégate du Roi La Boudeuse et la flûte L’Étoile, ed. 
Jacques Proust (Gallimard, Folio classique: 1982), ‘Discours préliminaire’, pp. 46-47.  
